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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, G. Lance Salladay, Personal Representative of the Estate
 of Roger Troutner 
(hereafter "the Estate") asserts that this case concerns the validity of a
 tax deed issued by 
Respondent, Canyon Irrigation Lateral District (hereafter "the Distric
t" or "CILD") without 
giving notice to the Estate of its intent to issue such a deed to a third p
arty. The District Court 
held that, on account of the lack of notice, the District had not made a
 "final decision" regarding 
issuance of the deed as required by Idaho Code§ 43-719(2) and rema
nded the case to the District 
so that such a decision could be made. Appellants (hereafter "the Bow
ens") challenge that 
decision on the grounds stated in their Opening Brief on Appeal. 
B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 
The Estate does not disagree with the Statement of Facts or Procedura
l History as 
described by the Bowens. However, it emphasizes, that, at all times re
levant to this litigation, the 
Estate of Roger Troutner was the record owner of the property located




ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Should the District Court's decision be upheld on the alternative gr
ounds stated by the 
Court in its Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration entered on A
ugust 4, 2015? 





THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
MEMORANDUM 
OF SALE WAS PROPERLY RECORDED 
1. The Memorandum of Sale was a properly Recorded Document and I
mparted 
Constructive Notice of its Contents to all Subsequent Purchasers 
The Bowens' argue that the Memorandum of Sale was not "properly 
recorded" because it 
did not contain a Certificate of Acknowledgment, which they conten
d is an absolute requirement 
and prerequisite for a document to be recorded pursuant to Idaho Co
de§ 55-805. Opening Brief 
on Appeal, (hereafter "Brief"), p.4. In support of their position, the B
owens quote a portion of 
Idaho Code§ 55-805: 
"Before an instrument may be recorded, unless it is otherwise express
ly 
provided, its execution much be acknowledged by the person executi
ng 
it... or the execution must be proved and the acknowledgment or proo
f, 
certified in substantially the manner prescribed by Chapter 7, Title 55
, 
Idaho Code; ... " (Emphasis added) 
The Bowens' argument thereafter focuses entirely on the words "ackn
owledged" and 
"acknowledgment" and on the forms of acknowledgment set forth in 
Idaho Code§ 55-701 et seq. 
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What the Bowens apparently do not recognize is 
that an acknowledgment is not 
necessary to the recording of a document. They f
ail to consider or to address the language of 
Idaho Code§ 55-805 which allows an alternative
 to an acknowledgment, that being the language 
emphasized in the quote from Idaho Code§ 55-8
05 appearing on the preceding page of this 
brief, tp wit: 
" the execution must be proved and the acknowle
dgment or proof, 
certified in substantially the manner prescribed in
 Chapter 7, title 55, 
Idaho Code;" 
In addressing and rejecting the Bowens' contentio
n that the Memorandum of Sale was not 
properly recorded, the District Court appropriatel
y recognized that "the relevance of the 
Memorandum of Sale is ... whether it was sufficie
nt to convey actual or constructive notice to the 
Defendant Canyon Irrigation Lateral District (CIL
D)". 
The court then noted that "Defendant CILD conc
edes that regardless of the sufficiency of 
the document on whether it was validly recorded,
 it should have given notice to Plaintiff Estate 
because Plaintiff Estate was either the owner or a
 party in interest, as defined by Idaho Code § 
43-714A". (R., p.116) 
The District Court addressed Idaho Code § 55-805
 and recognized that that code section 
"provides various ways of executing an instrumen
t", and in her analysis of that statute, the trial 
judge specifically addressed the disjunctive "or" 
immediately preceding the last clause, i.e., that 
"the execution must be proved, and the acknowle
dgment or proof, certified in substantially the 
manner prescribed in Chapter 7, Title 55, Idaho C
ode" (R., p. 1 l 8)(emphasis added). 
The court then stated: 
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"Thus, that method of execution is not in addition to the ways
 identified in 
the preceding clauses [ofldaho Code§ 55-805] but, instead, 
is an 
alternate method of execution, if none of the other, preceding
 ways of 
execution have been completed. Thus, Plaintiff could have ex
ecuted the 
Memorandum of Sale in one of two ways. It either could hav
e: 
1. its execution acknowledged by the person executing it, or; 
2. ensured the execution was proved and the acknowledgment 
or proof, was certified in substantially the manner prescribed
 
by Chapter 7, Title 55, Idaho Code." (R., pp. 118-119)( empha
sis added) 
Idaho Code§ 55-701 recognizes the validity of both "proofs"
 and "acknowledgments" of 
a document by providing that: 
"The proof or acknowledgment of an instrument may be mad
e at any place 
within this state, before a justice or Clerk of the Supreme Cou
rt, or a notary 
public, or the secretary of state, or United States commission
er."( emphasis added) 
Idaho Code§ 55-718 defines a valid "proof of execution" as 
authorized in Idaho Code§§ 55-701 
and 55-805, as follows: 
"Proof of the execution of an instrument, when not acknowle
dged, may be 
made either: 
1. By the parties executing it, or either of them; or 
2. By subscribing witness; or 
3. By other witnesses in the cases hereafter mentioned." 
( emphasis added) 
A subscribing witness is, by definition: 
"He who witnesses or attests the signature of a party to an ins
trument, 
and in testimony thereof subscribes his own name to the docu
ment. 
One who sees a writing executed, or hears it acknowledged, a
nd at 
the request of the party thereupon signs his name as witness" 
Blacks 
Law Dictionary, 1596 (revised 4th ed. 1969). 
The Memorandum of Sale at issue in this case was "proved" b
y a "subscribing witness", a 
notary public, in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 55-701, 55-718
 and 55-805, and was thus 
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properly recorded. The recording of the Memorandum therefore conveyed at least constructive 
notice to both CILD and to the Bowens, of the Estate's continued interest in the property. 
2. Idaho Code § 55-812 Does not Void the Memorandum of Sale Against the Bowens. 
The Bowens' next contention, that the Memorandum of Sale is void as against them, is 
without merit for the same reasons discussed in the preceding section of this brief 
Although the Bowens correctly quote, in part, the statutory language of Idaho Code§ 55-
805, including the alternative means of "proving" the execution of an instrument, they still focus 
only on the term "acknowledgment", while ignoring the alternative means of proving the 
execution of the document, as provided and authorized by Idaho Code§§ 55-701 and 55-718. 
As established in subpart I of this argument, the Memorandum of Sale was proved by a 
subscribing witness, a notary public of the state ofldaho, as is specifically provided and 
authorized by Idaho Code§§ 55-701 and 55-718, and it was therefore properly recorded, giving 
notice to all subsequent purchasers, and therefore is not void as against the Bowens. 
a. The Memorandum of Sale is an Instrument Entitled to be Recorded 
The Bowens argue that the Memorandum of Sale is not an instrument entitled to be 
recorded, relying on Idaho Code§ 55-813, which defines the term "conveyance", Idaho Code§ 
55-601, which states how a "conveyance" is made, and Hopkins v. Thomason Farms, Inc. (In re 
Thomason) Lexis 1769 at #11 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The Memorandum of Sale is not and does 
not pretend to be a "conveyance" of real property. Because it is not a "conveyance", the Bowens' 
argument misses the mark and is without merit. 
By definition, an "instrument" is: 
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"A written document; a formal or legal document, in writing ... a writing 
given as a means of affording evidence ... ; a writing executed and delivered 
as evidence of an act or agreement." Blacks Law Dictionary, 941 (revised 4th 
ed. 1969). 
Idaho Code § 55-818 authorizes the recording of a summary of an instrument creating an 
interest in or affecting title to or possession ofreal property. The Memorandum of Sale
 (R., p. 
85) is in fact a summary of a contract of sale referenced in the body of the Memorandu
m, where 
it states the purchaser's rights would vest in April of 2017, "assuming compliance with
 all terms 
and conditions of the contract". 
The Bowens mistakenly argue, in contending that the Memorandum of Sale is a 
conveyance, that the mailing address of the Troutner Estate needs to appear in the doc
ument. 
However, as is clear from the statute describing a "conveyance", only the address of th
e 
"grantee" (i.e. the buyer) is required, not the address of the grantor. See Idaho Code§ 
55-601. 
In fact, the grantee's address, 615 E Chicago Street, Caldwell, Idaho, is stated in the 
Memorandum of Sale. 
The Hopkins case relied on by the Bowens is inapplicable to the case at bar, because it
 
concerns the issue of the legal sufficiency of the contract at the time in that case (a mo
rtgage), 
not the issue of whether a summary of that document would have afforded notice to po
tential 
purchasers of the property of the interest claimed by the mortgagees in the property. 
b. The Memorandum of Sale is a Legally Valid Summary Instrument 
The Bowens next argue that the Memorandum of Sale is invalid, because, they assert, 
it 
fails to meet the requirements of Idaho Code § 5 5-818. The statute provides that a summa
ry of an 
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instrument creating an interest in or affecting title to or possession of real property may
 be 
recorded if certain requirements of the section are substantially met. The requirements
 which 
must be substantially met are: 
1 . The instrument must be signed and acknowledged by all parties to the 
original instrument; and 
2. The document must clearly state the names of the parties; and 
3. The document must clearly state the complete mailing address of the grantee; 
and 
4. The document must clearly state the title and date of the original instrument; 
and 
5. A description of the interest in real property being created; and 
6. The document must clearly state the legal description of the property. 
While the Estate must concede that the signature of the grantee is not on the Memoran
dum of 
Sale, the signature of the grantor, the critical signature for the transfer of real property,
 does 
appear, and it is proved by a notary public. 
The signature of the grantee is not a requirement in the creation of a conveyance. Idaho
 
Code§ 55-601 makes clear that only the grantee's name and mailing address must app
ear in an 
instrument of conveyance. Therefore the requirement of the grantee's signature on a su
mmary of 
the instrument referencing a contract of sale should not be deemed an absolute require
ment. 
Substantial compliance is accomplished by providing the Grantee's name and address. 
The remaining requirements of the statute are set forth in the Memorandum of Sale. O
nce 
again, the Bowens confuse the grantor and grantee of the transaction. The grantee is S
troud, and 
his name and address are specifically stated in the document. 
As noted, the statute in question provides that the requirements must only be substanti
ally 
met. This Court has long held that: 
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"Substantial performance is performance which despite deviation or omission 
provides the important and essential benefits of the contract.." Hull v. Giesler, 
156 Idaho 765, 331 P.3d 507 (2014); First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. 
v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 964 P .2d 654 rehearing denied ( 1998). 
Similarly, the term "substantial compliance" has been defined under Idaho Law as: 
" ... compliance which despite deviation or omission provides the important 
and essential benefits ... " Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F. 3d 278 (9th Cir. Idaho 2011 ). 
Substantial compliance does not require absolute conformity with the form prescribed 
in the 
statute, but does require a good faith attempt to comply and that the general purpose de
tailed in 
the statute is accomplished. Blacks Law Dictionary, 1566 (9th ed. 2009). In re: Termin
ation of 
Parental Rights of John Doe, 155 Idaho 896, 318 P.3d 886 (2014). 
The District Court correctly recognized that "substantial compliance" with the proof 
requirement of Idaho Code § 55-805 had been satisfied and determined that the Memorand
um of 
Sale was properly recorded (R., p.120). That finding should not be disturbed on appeal.
 
In the case of Farm Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745,605 P.2d 509
 
( 1980) the Idaho Supreme Court considered a claim very similar to the Bowens' presen
t claim. 
The issue in the Farm Bureau case was stated as follows: 
" ... whether the acknowledgment and recording of the Hendricks trust 
deed was sufficient to impart constructive notice to the respondents. In 
their respective answers, respondents raised by way of affirmative 
defense that the acknowledgment on the Hendricks trust deed was so 
patently defective as to render the acknowledgment void; that the trust 
deed in this posture was not entitled to recordation, and that, as a result, 
respondents could not be charged with constructive notice of its contents. " 
The Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of the deed of trust and its recordation s
tated, at 
60 5 P .2d 513: 
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"Idaho has generally adhered to the view that substant
ial compliance with 
the statutory requirements regarding acknowledgmen
ts will suffice. 
( citations omitted) The general view is in accord." 
*** 
"The primary purpose of the recording statutes is to g
ive 
notice to others that an interest is claimed in real prop
erty 
and thus give protection against bona fide third partie
s who 
may be dealing in the same property ... " Matheson v. H
arris, 
98 Idaho 758,761,572 P.2d 861, 864 (1977)" 
The Court then engaged in a discussion of the role an
d purpose of requiring a notary 
public's signature on a recorded document, "to provid
e protection against the recording of false 
instruments", at 605 P .2d 514, and recognized at 605 
P .2nd 518, that: 
"In Idaho, as in most states, there is a presumption of
 regularity in the 
performance of official duties by public officers. ( cita
tion omitted) A 
notary public is a bonded public official appointed by
 the governor ... 
Absent evidence to the contrary, therefore, notaries ar
e presumed to 
have properly carried out the duties of their office" (c
itation omitted). 
The Estate contends that the reference to the contract
 of sale in the Memorandum, the 
specific identification and address of the grantee and 
the signature of the grantor provide 
substantial compliance with Idaho Code § 5 5-818, and
 that the Memorandum of Sale 
substantially complied with the recording statutes Ida
ho Code§ 55-812 and Idaho Code§ 55-
818, was. As noted above, the District Court found th
at there had been substantial compliance 
with the statutes, and that determination should not b
e disturbed on appeal. 
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B. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
 EVEN IF THE MEMORANDUM 
OF SALE WAS NOT PROPERLY RECORDED, CILD
 WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE 
NOTICE OF THE DEFICIENCY AND OF THE TAX 
DEED SALE TO THE ESTATE. 
The Bowens' next claim is that the District Court was wro
ng in ruling that, even if the 
Memorandum of Sale was not entitled to be recorded, the
 Estate was entitled to receive notice of 
the proceedings. However, the Bowens do not argue this 
point and instead tum to a different 
issue, stating "there is simply no evidence in the record" t
o support the District Court's 
determination "that CILD failed to locate the Memorandu
m of Sale, resulting in Salladay not 
receiving notice of the sale", Brief, p. 10. The Bowens fa
iled, therefore, to argue the asserted 
error set forth in the title of subsection "B" of their argum
ent. 
The Bowens do argue, on page 10 of their Brief, that an A
ffidavit of the Personal 
Representative filed on behalf of the Estate, which attach
ed as an exhibit a letter from the 
attorney for CILD, should have been stricken on the grou
nds of hearsay. The letter at issue, 
written by the attorney for CILD, referring to certain docu
ments enclosed with her letter, states: 
"As you will see from the attached documents, the Troutn
er Estate was never specifically 
notified ( of the tax sale] The sale was advertised in the pa
per appropriately and Kelly Stroud was 
properly notified, but the Personal Representative of the T
routner Estate did not ever receive 
notice" R., pp. 51-52. The District Court, however, indica
ted the statement was an admission of a 
party opponent, and appellants agreed, (TR., p.18, 1.19-p.
19, l.2) and (TR., p.20, l. 14-19). The 
Court properly refused to strike the statement. 
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Contrary to the Bowens' startling assertion that there is nothing in the record
 to indicate 
that the Estate did not receive notice of the sale, the record includes substan
tial evidence to that 
effect, even if the letter from CILD's attorney is ignored: (1) paragraph 10 o
f the Answer of 
CILD to the Petition filed by the Estate admits that the District did not prov
ide notice to the 
Estate (R., p.10); (2) The Bowens' own Statement of Facts in the Brief, at p
. 2, L.L. 2-3, states 
the "fact" that '"'Salladay did not receive a notice letter for the sale of the O
 & M deed"; (3) 
Paragraph 5 of the Affidavit of G. Lance Salladay filed on May 8, 2015, cle
arly stating that no 
notice was received (R., pp. 48-49); and (4) the attorney for CILD admitted
 on the record that 
CILD did not locate the Memorandum of Sale in the records of Canyon Co
unty. (TR., p.113, 
L.L.11-13) 
Thus, even if this Court were to rule that Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Mr. S
alladay 
should have been stricken on some basis, there is more than adequate evide
nce in the record that 
CILD did not provide the Troutner Estate with notice of the tax deficiency 
or of the tax sale. 
This Court has previously considered and ruled on the effect of a party not 
having 
received notice prior to the issuance of a tax deed in the case of Sines v. Bla
ser, 100 Idaho 50, 
592 P .2d 1367 (1979). While Sines involved a property tax deficiency and s
ubsequent sale of the 
property at a tax sale, the facts and law are extremely close to the facts at is
sue in the case at bar. 
The Blasers mvned property in Canyon County on which they did not pay t
axes over a 
period of 4 years. The property was titled in the name of Albert E. Blaser a
nd Ruth L. Blaser, as 
husband and wife. The County sent notice of the tax deficiency only to Alb
ert Blaser and, when 
the letter was returned unclaimed, the County published notice of delinquen
cy in the local paper, 
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identif}ing only Albert Blaser as the owner of the p
roperty. Subsequently the Sines purchased 
the property at the tax sale. The Blasers then filed a
 vendor's lien against the property, and the 
Sines filed suit to quiet title to the property. At trial
, the Blasers argued that the tax deed was 
void because notice had not been given as required 
by statute - that no effort had been made to 
notify Ruth L. Blaser, who was also a titled owner o
f the property, of the pending issuance of the 
tax deed. 
While the District Court ruled in favor of the Sines,
 the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court, stating in what would seem to be a dispositiv
e ruling in the instant case: 
"According to Idaho Code § 63-113 3 a County is not 
entitled to a tax deed 
until the notice requirements of I. C. § 63-1134 have be
en satisfied ... 
*** 
When two or more owners of property reside at the 
same address, a single 
notice addressed to both of them is sufficient compl
iance with the above 
statute. The giving of such notice is mandatory and t
he lack of it a 
fatal defect .... " 592 P. d at 1369.(emphasis added) 
Because the County had only attempted notice to A
lbert Blaser and had made no attempt to give 
notice to Ruth L. Blaser, the tax deed to the Sines w
as deemed void. Therefore, the District Court 
judgment in favor of the Sines was reversed. 
By the same token in the instant case, the Troutner 
Estate, which was the recorded owner 
of the property, was never notified of the proposed 
tax sale and was entitled to notice, regardless 
of whether the Memorandum of Sale is determined
 to be valid. 
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1. The Language of the Memorandum of Sale in "Present Perfect Tense" Does Not Affect 
the Requirement of Notice to The Estate. 
The Estate does not understand this argument by the Bowens. Their whole brief argues 
the invalidity of the Memorandum of Sale. Hence, however, they argue that the filing of the 
Memorandum estops the Estate from claiming to be an owner of the property. This can hardly be 
true if the Memorandum is deemed to be void as the Bowens elsewhere contend. 
In any event, the Estate notes that the contract of sale was entered into either before, or 
simultaneously with, the Memorandum of Sale. However, the buyer's rights under the contract 
did not vest until April of 2017. 
Therefore, since the buyers had no vested right in the property until April of 2017, the 
Estate was still the record owner of the property at the times relevant to this action. At the very 
least, the Estate was still a party interested in the title to the property at issue. Any argument by 
the Bowens to the contrary is simply mistaken. 
2. There is No Requirement That the Contract of Sale be Recorded 
The Bowens argue that the Memorandum of Sale "may" contain ambiguities, and 
continue the thread of their previous claim that saying that "there has been sold" suggests the 
completion of a sale, despite the following language, "subject to ... compliance with the terms of 
the Contract of Sale", which clearly indicates future obligations, as does the specified future 
"vesting" date (R., p. 85) 
There is no authority for the proposition that a summary of a contract affecting the title to 
property has to include anything more than the elements listed on page 11 of this brief. Those 
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elements do not include the purchase price or terms of payment or o
ther terms required by the 
Courts in the contract itself. See, e.g., Hopkin v. Thomason Farms, I
nc. (in re Thomason), 2009 
Bankr, LEXIS 1769 at xl 1 (Bankr D. Idaho June 24, 2009). There is
, therefore, no requirement 
that the Memorandum of Sale states all of the terms necessary to the
 contract. The Bowens' 
argument to the contrary is simply without merit. 
C. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REMANDING THE MATTER TO 
THE CILD BOARD 
BECAUSE WITHOUT NOTICE TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIE
S THE CILD BOARD 
COULD NOT MAKE A FINAL DECISION. 
The District Court, in remanding the matter to the CILD board in its
 initial Order to 
Remand the Board for Determination of Validity of Tax, entered on
 May 26, 2015 (R., pp.71-
80), determined that Idaho Code§ 43-714(4) allows any party aggri
eved by the final decision of 
the Board concerning the issuance of a tax deed to seek judicial rev
iew (R., p. 78). The court 
found that the Estate was clearly an aggrieved party, but that there h
ad been no "final decision" 
from which the Estate could seek review (R., p. 78). 
The Court's basis for this determination, much the same as that of th
e Supreme Court's 
decision in Sines, supra., was that Idaho Code § 43-719(1) only auth
orized the board to issue a 
tax deed "when a record owner or owners or any party in interest up
on whom a notice of pending 
issuance of tax deed is served ... ". Since the Estate, being both the tit
led owner of the property 
and a party in interest, never received notice, the board could not ha
ve made a final decision, and 
thus a remand to determine the validity of the issuance of the tax de
ed was necessary. 
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If no notice was given to the Estate, then th
e issuance of the tax deed in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 43-719(1) was/is invalid, sin
ce notice is a prerequisite to the issuance o
f a tax 
deed. See Sines, supra. 
The Bowens' argument simply overlooks th
e critical and absolute requirement that noti
ce 
be provided to the owners or any party in i
nterest. Without notice there is no due proc
ess as 
required by the 14th Amendment to the Un
ited States Constitution. 
The Bowens' argument is that Idaho Code 
§ 43-719 "provides a chronological step-by-
step remedy to an aggrieved party that beg
ins only while a tax deed is 'pending issuan
ce' and not 
at any time thereafter" Brief, p.12. Since no
 issuance of a tax deed was pending at the t
ime of the 
Court's ruling, the argument continues, no 
remedy exists for the Estate. Brief, pp. 12-1
3. The 
flaw in the argument is that the Bowens ign
ore the critical and constitutionally mandat
ed 
prerequisite of notice before a tax deed can
 be issued. Without the proper notice havin
g been 
given, the deed in favor of the Bowens is v
oid ab initio. 
The statute, as written, necessarily assume
s that proper notice was given by CILD. 
However, the undisputed fact in the instant
 case is that no notice was given to the Esta
te. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has considered
 a case similar to the case now before this 
Court, in Dufur v. Nampa and Meridian lrr
ig. Dist., 128 Idaho 319,912 P.2d 687 (199
6). In that 
case, the Dufurs owned real property withi
n the irrigation district, but did not receive 
nor use 
water from the district The Dufurs failed t
o pay the district assessment over a four ye
ar period, 
and pursuant to the then existing statute, th
e district published notice of the delinquenc
y and 
mailed notice to the Dufurs, advising them
 that unless they paid the delinquencies the
ir property 
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would be sold at auction on a specific date. The Dufurs did no
t pay the delinquency and their 
property was sold. At that time, the statutes in question did not
 provide for a hearing by the 
district prior to the public sale of delinquent properties. 
The Dufurs sued, challenging the constitutionality of the statut
e since it did not provide 
for a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the District de
prived them of their property 
interest (i.e. no due process), and therefore that the tax deed wa
s void, or voidable, and subject to 
cancellation by the Court. 
The trial court held that certain of the statutes in question were
 unconstitutional because 
they failed to provide minimum constitutional due process pro
tection. The district court 
subsequently declared the tax deeds null and void and restored
 title to the property to the Dufurs. 
On appeal, the Irrigation District asserted, that the district cour
t lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
In rejecting the district's claim, the Idaho Court of Appeals said
: 
"The record shows that the Irrigation District gave the Dufurs n
otice of 
the tax deed auction, but did not provide them with a hearing p
rior to 
taking possession of the Dufurs' real property interests. The rig
ht to enjoy 
property without unlawful deprivation is a "personal" right wh
ich has long 
been recognized. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S.
 538, 552, 92 
S. Ct. 1113 1121, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972). Both notice and a he
aring are 
required under the Fourteenth Amendment before such a depri
vation of an 
individual's property takes place. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 6
7, 81-82, 92 
S. Ct. 1983, 1994-95, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). The purpose of t
hese 
requirements is not only 'to ensure abstract fair play to the indi
vidual' but to 
also protect the individual's use and possession of property from
 arbitrary 
encroachment. Id. at 81, 92 S.Ct. at 1994. Furthermore, the rig
ht to be heard 
does not depend upon an advance showing that one will prevai
l at the hearing. 
Id. at 81, 92 S.Ct. at 1997." (emphasis added) 
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In the instant case, the statute provides for both notice and a hearing, but the District failed to 
provide notice as required. Without having provided notice, the tax deed, according to Dufur, is 
void. 
The Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District also alleged on appeal, as do the Bowens in 
this case, that the District Court ordered a remedy not in conformity with the Idaho Code. The 
Bowens claim that the exclusive statutory remedy in Idaho Code§ 43-719 applies only while the 
tax deed is pending and thus the district court did not have authority to award different relief. 
The Court of Appeals, considering the similar claim in Dufur, said: 
"Having reviewed the record, we reject the Irrigation District's argument 
that I.C. § 43-726 created an exclusive remedy. The Dufurs did not bring 
this litigation merely to question the constitutionality of the statutes at 
issue, but they brought this action as owners seeking to quiet title and to 
recover damages. Because the noted statutes were found to be 
unconstitutional, the tax deeds were appropriately voided and title was 
restored to the Dufurs. We hold that the district court had the authority to 
fashion an equitable remedy in this quiet-title action, and that the court 
was not limited to the unconstitutional statutory claims relating to 
irrigation districts." ( emphasis added) 
While the statutes in question have been amended since Dufur to provide for a hearing 
prior to the forfeiture of property on account of delinquent tax assessments, the procedures, if not 
properly followed to assure that both notice and an opportunity for hearing are provided to all 
parties in interest, still violate due process. Clearly, based on the holding in Dufur, the District 
Court had authority to remand the case for a determination as to whether notice was provided to 
the Estate, and if not, then the Board could, and should, declare the tax deed issued to the 
Bowens to be void, or voidable. 
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The Bowens' contention, based on Idaho Code § 4 3-720(7), that issuance of the tax deed 
is prima facie evidence of the regularity of all other proceedings for the assessment, inclusive, up 
to the execution of the deed (Brief, p.13) ignores that basic principle of law that prima facie 
evidence is not conclusive and is an alternative label for a rebuttable presumption. See State v. 
Hebner, 108 Idaho 196,697 P.2d 1210 (Ct. App. 1985). 
In the instant case the "presumption" urged by the Bowens as to the regularity of all 
proceedings was clearly rebutted by the uncontradicted evidence that the Estate did not receive 
the required notice of either the tax deficiency, or of the pending issuance of the tax deed. 
The Bowens' reliance on Idaho Code § 43-719 as providing a prohibition to any 
remanding to the Irrigation District must fail, since the entirety of that statutory process for the 
issuance of a tax deed presupposes that notice was given. 
Where no notice has been provided as required, the Board cannot make a final decision 
because the owner or party in interest has not been provided with the constitutionally required 
due process. 
D. 
THE EST ATE 'S PETITION WAS TIMELY FILED 
While the Bowens contend that the Estate's Petition was not timely filed, the argument 
relies solely on the flawed prior contention that the Board of the District could make a final 
decision without having provided notice to all owners and interested parties of the tax deficiency 
and an opportunity to correct the deficiency, and be heard, prior to the issuance of a tax deed. 
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Further, and while the Estate clearly does not suggest or concede that the action of the 
Board on December 19, 2014, accepting the bid of the Bowens' to purchase the subject property 
and thereafter issuing the tax deed (R., p. 57) was a valid "final decision", the Estate's Petition 
was filed on January 5, 2015, well within thirty (30) days of that Board action, as required by 
Idaho Code§ 43-714(4). 
E. 
THE ESTATE DID NOT RECEIVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDING 
ISSUANCE OF THE TAX DEED 
The Bowens next argue, on the basis ofldaho Code§ 43-717(6), that, because it is 
undisputed that Stroud, the buyer of the property from the Estate, received notice of the pending 
issuance of the tax deed, that notice should be imputed to the Estate. This argument is 
unsupported by any authority and should be rejected out of hand. 
Idaho Code § 43-717(6) reads: 
"If a record owner or owners or a party in interest shall have actual 
knowledge of the notice of pending issuance of a tax deed or that 
issuance of a tax deed is pending, it shall be deemed sufficient 
notice under this section." ( emphasis added) 
The plain intent of the statute is to provide that an owner with actual notice of the pending 
issuance of a tax deed shall be deemed to have sufficient notice under the statute, regardless of 
whether the statutory procedures were followed. The statute does not say that notice to one 
owner is notice to all owners. Such a reading of the statute would, in fact, be contrary to Sines v. 
Blaser, supra. The argument to the contrary by the Bowens is erroneous and frivolous. 
The statute in question, Idaho Code § 43-717, in the introductory section ( 1 ), states: 
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"The treasurer of the district.. shall serve or cause to be served, 
written notice of pending issuance of tax deed upon the record owner 
or owners and parties in interest of record in the following exclusive 
manner ... " 
The conjunctive "or" between owner or owners can only be read as a recognition that a 
property may have more than one owner, but the notice requirement further mandates further 
notice to parties in interest, not by using the alternative "or", but with the conjunctive "and". In 
light of the statute's specific requirement of notice to all owners and parties of interest, the 
Bowens' reliance on subsection 6 of the statute is without merit and must fail, just as did the 
Irrigation District's argument in Sines. 
F. 
EVEN CONCEDING THE MERIT OF THE BOWENS' ARGUMENTS REGARDING 
THE MEMORANDUM OF SALE AND THE RECORDING OF THAT DOCUMENT, 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
The Bowen's long, intricate arguments regarding the Memorandum of Sale and the 
recording of the document might lead one to conclude that the invalidity of that document, if 
proved, means that the Bowens win this appeal. Nothing can be further from the truth. The 
Bowens are so busy looking for flaws in the document that they have disregarded the crux of this 
case. 
This case turns on whether the Estate was entitled to receive notice of the pending 
issuance of the tax deed by CILD. If it was, the Bowens lose, because it was undisputed that the 
Estate received no such notice. 
For reasons that are not clear to the Estate, the Bowens have focused all of their energy 
upon the Memorandum of Sale that asserts the Estate is to retain an interest in the property until 
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April of 201 arguing vigorously and ingeniously that the Memor
andum was not entitled to be 
filed and that it is void on its face for any one of a number of alleg
ed failings. 
Assume, however, that the Memorandum of Sale is void, for what
ever reason. Who then 
is the record owner of the property? It is undisputed that the Estate
 would be the record holder of 
the title. That means that it would still be entitled to notice under I
daho Code§ 43-717. That the 
District Court recognized this point is perfectly evident from its fi
nal ruling on the Bowens' 
Motion for Reconsideration: 
R., pp. 120-121. 
"Alternatively, if the document was not properly recorded, then 
there is no evidence of any conveyance by Plaintiff to Stroud. The
re 
does not appear to be any dispute that Plaintiff Estate was either an
 
owner or an interested party prior to any conveyance to Stroud. As
 
such, if the Memorandum of Sale was not properly recorded, 
Defendant CILD was still legally required to provide notice to 
Plaintiff Estate. Thus, under either scenario, Plaintiff Estate was 
entitled to notice. 
Because the document was properly recorded and/or Plaintiff Esta
te 
was the owner or interested party even without the Memorandum 
of 
Sale being recorded, Defendant CILD had constructive notice purs
uant 
to LC.§ 55-811 that Plaintiff Estate was either an owner or party o
f 
interest and therefore, was required to give Plaintiff Estate notice 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 43-719 ... " 
Thus, the Bowens have wasted all of the vigor and ingenuity in th
eir arguments, because 
even if they prevail on those points, the District Court was still co
rrect in its conclusion that the 
Estate was entitled to notice of the deficiency and pending issuanc
e of the tax deed. The Estate is 
still entitled to notice, because it would still be the owner of the pr
operty. This is why the 
Bowens' arguments lead nowhere. Invalidating the Memorandum 
of Sale merely confirms the 
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District Court's conclusion that the Estate was entitled to notice and confirm
s that its final order 
should be upheld. 
Moreover, the Bowens have not even challenged the alternative ruling of the
 District 
Court in their Brief. Not one of their arguments would invalidate that ruling. 
Thus, they 
implicitly concede that ruling, which makes their appeal even more pointless
. 
G. 
THE ESTATE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS COSTS AND ATTORNE
Y FEES. 
The instant case presents a situation in which CILD, by its own admission, fa
iled to 
discover a properly recorded Memorandum of Sale and thus failed to provide
 notice to the Estate 
which was both an owner and interested party of the property at issue. The fa
ct that the Estate 
did not receive notice is undisputed. 
The Estate has prevailed in the District Court and should prevail in this appe
al for the 
same reasons determined by the District Court. 
Idaho Code§ 43-719(5) mandates the award of attorney fees and costs to the
 prevailing 
party: 
"All costs and fees of any hearing or proceeding shall be awarded to the 
prevailing party." (emphasis added) 
Thus, when the Estate prevails in this appeal, this statute requires that attorne
y fees be 
awarded in its favor against the Bowens. 
The same conclusion follows from the fact that the Bowens have wasted the 
Court's time 
by presenting issues that are ultimately pointless. The real issue in this case w
as whether the 
Estate was entitled to notice. The Bowens' arguments, even if conceded, lead
 to precisely that 
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result. The only possible exception to that general statem
ent is the Bowens' argument to the 
effect that notice to the buyer (Stroud) was notice to the s
eller (the Estate). That argument, 
however, was without authority, was contradicted by a de
cision from this Court, i.e., Sines v. 
Blaser, supra. and was therefore frivolous. For all of thes
e reasons, this appeal is frivolous, and 
the Estate is therefore entitled to attorney fees under Idah
o Code § 12-121 as well as pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 43-719(5). 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's rulings should be affirmed. The Estat
e should be awarded attorney 
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